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Abstract
Recently there has been much interest in quan-
tifying the robustness of neural network clas-
sifiers through adversarial risk metrics. How-
ever, for problems where test-time corruptions
occur in a probabilistic manner, rather than
being generated by an explicit adversary, ad-
versarial metrics typically do not provide an
accurate or reliable indicator of robustness.
To address this, we introduce a statistically
robust risk (SRR) framework which measures
robustness in expectation over both network
inputs and a corruption distribution. Unlike
many adversarial risk metrics, which typically
require separate applications on a point-by-
point basis, the SRR can easily be directly
estimated for an entire network and used as
a training objective in a stochastic gradient
scheme. Furthermore, we show both theo-
retically and empirically that it can scale to
higher-dimensional networks by providing su-
perior generalization performance compared
with comparable adversarial risks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the discovery of the phenomenon of adversar-
ial examples for neural networks (Szegedy et al., 2014;
Goodfellow et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016), a variety
of approaches for assessing and mitigating their practi-
cal impact on decision-making systems have been pro-
posed (Gu and Rigazio, 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016; Madry et al., 2018). Much of this work has fo-
cused on the formal verification of properties of neural
network classifiers, such as the robustness of individual
decisions under an Lp-norm perturbation set (Majum-
dar and Kuncak, 2017; Gehr et al., 2018; Wang et al.,
2018), typically doing this in an input-specific manner.
However, in practice, one is usually concerned with the
overall robustness of the network, that is, its robustness
across the range of possible inputs that it will see at
test-time, something which is typically far more diffi-
cult to characterize and calculate. This has motivated
network-wide robustness definitions, such as average
minimal adversarial definitions (Fawzi et al., 2018) and
adversarial risk/accuracy (Madry et al., 2018), as well
training schemes aiming to produce networks which
perform well under these metrics (Wong and Kolter,
2018; Madry et al., 2018).
Motivated by applications in which an explicit adver-
sary is working against the network, these metrics
generally focus on worst-case robustness, that is, they
are based on the largest loss within the perturbed re-
gion. Notwithstanding, there are a variety of reasons
why this may not always be preferable behavior.
Firstly, there are many applications where one is con-
cerned about robustness to naturally occurring or ran-
dom perturbations of the inputs, rather than an ex-
plicit test-time adversary. For example, in many safety-
critical applications like self-driving cars, we may not
have access to the exact inputs due to sensor imper-
fections and wish to ensure our predictions are robust
to such variations. Here our classifier must account
for these variations, but some level of risk will usually
be acceptable: it will typically be neither feasible nor
necessary to guarantee there are no possible adversarial
inputs, but we instead wish to evaluate the probability
of there being such an input.
Secondly, previous work has shown that worse-case
robustness metrics can have very poor generalization
from train to test time (Schmidt et al., 2018; Yin et al.,
2019), both from a theoretical perspective and in prac-
tice for real networks, thereby substantially reducing
their applicability.
Finally, whereas the motivation for requiring worst-
case robustness for individual inputs is often clear, it
is more difficult to motivate using worst-case robust-
ness for the classifier as a whole. Specifically, because
there will typically be some randomness in the exact
inputs observed at test-time, our classifier can only be
perfectly worse-case robust if it is robust to all possible
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perturbations of all possible inputs, something which
will very rarely be achievable for practical problems.
To address these issues, we build on the statistical ro-
bustness work of Webb et al. (2019), which quantifies
the expected robustness of an individual decision un-
der an input perturbation distribution, to construct
a framework for characterizing the overall robustness
of a network in a statistical manner. Specifically, we
introduce the notion of a statistically robust risk (SRR),
a class of metrics that can be used to assess the overall
robustness of a neural network classifier by averaging
a loss function over both possible inputs and an input
perturbation distribution.
Unlike worst-case robustness approaches, our SRR
framework naturally applies at a network-wide level
due to the law of total expectation. We demonstrate
that the SRR can differ significantly from both the cor-
responding natural (i.e., non-robust) and adversarial
(i.e., worst-case) risks, and as such provides a unique
metric for both training and testing networks that helps
ensure robustness to probabilistic input perturbations.
We provide theoretical and empirical evidence that
the SRR has superior generalization performance to
the corresponding adversarial risk, particularly in high-
dimensions, with bounds on the generalization error
respectively scaling as O(log(d)) and O(
√
d) in the size
of the network. This suggests that it may be possible to
obtain statistically robust networks in a wide range of
applications where adversarial robustness is still elusive
or inappropriate.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Adversarial Examples
Although the general concept of adversarial examples
(a perturbed input data point that is classified poorly)
is well understood, the precise definition is often left im-
plicit in literature, despite many versions being present.
To formalize this, let fθ represent the classifier (with
parameters θ) and c a hypothetical ground-truth “ref-
erence” classifier. Let x be the original input point and
x′ the perturbed input point. Then at least 3 different
definitions are commonly used (Diochnos et al., 2018):
• Prediction change (PC) fθ(x′) 6= fθ(x);
• Corrupted instance (CI) fθ(x′) 6= c(x);
• Error region (ER) fθ(x′) 6= c(x′).
For pointwise robustness metrics (Szegedy et al., 2014;
Webb et al., 2019), we are usually concerned with cases
where the original point was classified correctly and so
the PC and CI definitions coincide. However, the dis-
tinction is important when we are working with overall
metrics over multiple data points (some of which will
be incorrectly classified). Unless otherwise explicitly
stated, we will take the CI definition in this paper.
2.2 Adversarial Risk
The risk of a classifier fθ is a measure of its average
performance with respect to the data distribution:
r(fθ) = E(X,Y )∼pD [L(X,Y, fθ)] , (1)
where (X,Y ) is an input/target pair, pD is the true data
generating distribution, and L is some loss function.
For non-robust risks, L(X,Y, fθ) can usually be written
in the form φ(fθ(X), Y ), which we term the natural
risk. For example, the 0-1 and cross-entropy losses:
φ01(fθ(X), Y ) , 1arg maxi=1,··· ,M fθ(X)i 6=Y , (2)
φCE(fθ(X), Y ) , − log(fθ(X)Y ). (3)
To model the effect of an adversary limited to additively
perturbing inputs by a vector δ within a limited set ∆
(e.g., an L∞-ball), adversarial risk is defined as (Madry
et al., 2018)
radv(fθ) , E(X,Y )∼pD
[
max
δ∈∆
φ(fθ(X + δ), Y )
]
, (4)
which is in fact a form of risk with loss function
Ladv = maxδ∈∆ φ(fθ(X+δ), Y ). When the 0-1 loss φ01
function is used, this is known as adversarial accuracy.
Empirical versions R(fθ) and Radv(fθ) of both defi-
nitions can be obtained by replacing the expectation
over pD with a Monte Carlo average over a training
dataset {(x1, y1), ..., (xN , yN )}. The standard training
of a classifier then corresponds to solving the optimiza-
tion problem minθ R(fθ). For adversarial risks, this
corresponds to a class of well-known minimax problems
called robust optimization (Ben-Tal et al., 2009).
Methods for solving this optimization problem typically
include a subroutine for approximating the inner maxi-
mization before performing training on the neural net-
work parameters θ. Adversarial training (Goodfellow
et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2018),
provides a lower bound on the inner maximization by
using gradient-based methods to generate maximally
adversarial examples. Other methods, instead, upper
bound the inner maximization by approximating the
neural network using convex relaxations before perform-
ing the outer minimization on that structure (Wong
and Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018).
2.3 Statistical Robustness
Webb et al. (2019) recently introduced a statistical
robustness metric that provides a statistical alterna-
tive to formal verification of neural network properties.
They model inputs using an input distribution, p(·),
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and define their metric to be the probability of viola-
tion under this. This provides more information than
standard verification about the network’s robustness:
if the property is not violated, then the probability is 0,
whereas if there exists a violation, the metric indicates
how likely the event of violation is.
Formally, they define their robustness metric using:
• A property function s(x′; fθ, ψ) defined over the
input space x′ ∈ X , where fθ is the neural network
and ψ is problem specific parameters (e.g. the
true label). This is designed such that the event
E = {s(x′; fθ, ψ) ≥ 0} represents a violation of the
property, which could, for example, represent the
misclassification of the target.
• An input distribution p(x′), typically taking the
form of a perturbation distribution p(x′|x).
Their statistical robustness metric is then given by the
integral (suppressing fθ and ψ from s)
I[p, s] , PX′∼p(·)(s(X ′) ≥ 0)
=
∫
X
1s(x′)≥0 p(x′) dx′.
(5)
An important application of this method is to point-
wise robustness for neural network classifiers. Standard
verification schemes target the binary 0-1 metric on
whether an adversarial example exists in a perturba-
tion region ∆ around a point. On the other hand, the
statistical robustness metric can determine the prob-
ability of drawing an adversarial example from some
perturbation distribution.
Because E often constitutes a (potentially very) rare
event, numerically calculating (5) can be challenging.
To address this, Webb et al. (2019) further introduce
an estimation approach based around adaptive multi-
level splitting (AMLS) (Guyader et al., 2011) and show
that this can effectively estimate I[p, s] even for large
networks and high-dimensional input spaces.
3 STATISTICALLY ROBUST
METRICS
Despite the statistical robustness framework introduced
in the last section having numerous attractive proper-
ties for quantifying neural network robustness, Webb
et al. (2019) only consider using it for assessing point-
wise robustness. We now show how it can be straight-
forwardly extended to characterize the robustness of a
whole network, and, in turn, how this can be adapted
to a notion of statistically robust risk, which, unlike the
approach of Webb et al. (2019), is suitable for network
training as well as evaluating existing networks.
3.1 The Total Statistical Robustness Metric
The statistical robustness metric can be straightfor-
wardly extended to a metric for the whole network by
simply averaging the pointwise metric over the data
generating distribution. This allows us to define the
total statistical robustness metric (TSRM) as
Itotal[p, s] = E(X,Y )∼pD
[
EX′∼p(·|X)
[
1s(X′)≥0
]]
, (6)
where pD is the true data generating distribution and
p(·|X) is the perturbation distribution around a point
X (which will typically be additive, i.e. p(X + δ |
X) = p(δ)). Intuitively, Itotal can be thought of as the
probability that the property will be violated for an
arbitrary input point and perturbation at test time,
e.g. the probability the target will be misclassified.
Given the sophisticated Monte Carlo machinery re-
quired to accurately estimate the statistical robustness
metric, it may at first seem like Itotal will be impracti-
cally difficult to estimate. Indeed, if one were to draw
data points at random and separately run the estima-
tion approach of Webb et al. (2019) this would indeed
be the case. However, there are two key factors, which
mean that this can be avoided. Firstly, the law of total
expectation means we can treat (6) as a single expec-
tation over (X,Y,X ′) ∼ pD(X,Y )p(X ′|X). Secondly,
Itotal is typically dominated by a small subset of the
inputs for which the pointwise statistical robustness is
large. For these points, E is typically not an especially
rare event and can thus be estimated efficiently by sim-
ple Monte Carlo, thereby requiring substantially less
computational effort.1 Therefore, surprisingly, Itotal
can typically be accurately estimated with comparable,
and often noticeably less, computation than a single
instance of the pointwise metric.
3.2 Statistically Robust Risk
The TSRM forms a useful metric for already trained
networks, yet it is not suitable as an objective for
training due to the difficulty of taking gradients through
the identity function. Furthermore, it only applies to
cases where we wish to estimate a probability of failure,
rather than a more general loss.
To address these issues, we note that the TSRM can
be thought of as a specific risk and thus generalized to
rstat(p, fθ) = E(X,Y )∼pD
[
EX′∼p(·|X) [φ(fθ(X ′), Y )]
]
,
(7)
where φ represents a natural, pointwise, loss function
1Though we did also develop an AMLS method specifi-
cally adapted to the needs of Itotal, we found in practice
that this was typically less efficient than the simple Monte
Carlo estimator and therefore unnecessary.
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as per Section 2.2.2 We refer to rstat(p, fθ) as the
statistically robust risk (SRR). The link to the TSRM
is straightforward, with TSRM constituting the special
case of φ(fθ(X ′), Y ) = 1s(X′;fθ,Y )≥0. Note that the
SRR corresponds to using the loss function
Lstat(X,Y, f) , Ep(X′|X) [φ(fθ(X ′), Y )] . (8)
Critically, the SRR allows us to use differentiable
losses, φ, such that it can form an objective for ro-
bust neural network training using stochastic gradient
descent. Namely, by exploiting the law of total ex-
pectation, we can draw data points from the training
data, (Xn, Yn) ∼ pD(·, ·), draw corresponding sample
perturbations X ′n ∼ p(· | X = Xn), and then update
the network using the unbiased gradient updates
∇θrstat(p, fθ) ≈ 1
N
N∑
n=1
∇θ (φ(fθ(X ′), Y )) , (9)
noting that this is equivalent to conventional training
but with the inputs randomly perturbed.
The SRR further provides a mechanism for linking
statistical robustness back to the conventional notions
of natural and adversarial risk, as well as a basis for
theoretical analysis (see Section 4). For example, we
see that the natural risk can be viewed as a special
case of the SRR for which p(X ′|X) collapses to a Dirac
delta measure about X. On the other hand, in the ad-
ditive perturbation case, that is p(X ′|X) = p(δ) where
δ = X ′ −X, we see that when the support of p(δ) is
contained within the perturbation set ∆, the SRR, rstat,
is upper bounded by the adversarial risk, radv, since
Eδ∼p(·) [φ(fθ(X + δ), y′)] ≤ maxδ∈∆ φ(fθ(X + δ), Y ).
At a high-level, training using the SRR has the effect of
“smoothing” the decision boundaries relative to using
the corresponding natural risk. This can be useful when
we want to be sensitive to certain classes or events, as
it allows us to train our classifier to take conservative
actions when the input is close to potentially problem-
atic regions. For example, a self-driving car needs to
ensure it avoids false negatives when predicting the
presence of a pedestrian in its path.
4 THEORETICAL
GENERALIZATION ANALYSIS
Though adversarial training is effective for reducing the
adversarial risk of neural networks on MNIST, success
has been limited in scaling up to higher-dimensional
datasets such as CIFAR-10. Schmidt et al. (2018) show
2In certain cases, we may further require φ to also take
X directly as an input. This potential dependency is not
problematic and omitted simply for notational clarity.
that this is due to a generalization gap, whereby it is
possible to achieve an adversarial accuracy of 97% on
the training set, yet just 47% on the test set. This
overfitting is in contrast to the natural case where well-
tuned networks of sufficient capacity rarely overfit on
CIFAR-10. We explore whether this gap still holds for
our total statistical robustness metric through the lens
of Rademacher complexity.
Let rD(f) = E(X,Y )∼pD [L(X,Y, f)] be the risk
of a classifier f under a distribution pD and
RN (f) the corresponding empirical risk for dataset
{(X1, Y1), ..., (XN , YN )}. It is well known in statisti-
cal learning theory that we can probabilistically upper
bound the generalization error rD(f) − RN (f) of a
learning algorithm using notions of complexity on the
admissible set of classifiers and loss function (Shalev-
Shwartz and Ben-David, 2014). Intuitively, if the ad-
missible set of functions is less complex, then there is
less capacity to overfit to the training data.
To be more precise, we define the empirical Rademacher
complexity (ERC) for a function class F : Rd → R and
a sample S = {X1, ..., XN} of size N with elements in
Rd to be (Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David, 2014):
RadS(F) := 1
N
Eσ
[
sup
f∈F
N∑
n=1
σnf(Xn)
]
, (10)
where σ1, ..., σN are independent Rademacher random
variables, which take either the value −1 or +1, each
with probability 12 . Intuitively, this measures the com-
plexity of the class by determining how many different
ways functions f ∈ F can classify the sample S.
Using the ERC and defining the loss function class LF
to be LF , {(X,Y ) → L(X,Y, f) : f ∈ F}, we can
now bound the generalization error using the following
Theorem from Yin et al. (2019):
Theorem 1. Suppose 0 ≤ L(X,Y, f) ≤ c for all
X,Y, f . Suppose further that the samples S =
{(X1, Y1), ..., (XN , YN )} are i.i.d. from a distribution
pD. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have, for all f ∈ F ,
PS∼pD
(
rD(f)−RN (f) ≤ 2c RadS(LF )
+3c
√
log(2/δ)/(2N)
)
> 1− δ,
(11)
where rD(f) is the risk and
RN (f) ,
1
N
N∑
n=1
L(Xn, Yn, f) (12)
is the empirical risk.
This bound is probabilistic, data-dependent and uni-
form over all f ∈ F . This means it holds for all
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f ∈ F , including those trained on the dataset S. To
take advantage of it, we need to be able to compute
RadS(LF ). The Rademacher complexity of the set
of neural network classifiers RadS(F) can be upper
bounded (Bartlett et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2019) by an
expression which is O(log(dmax)), where dmax is the
maximal number of nodes in a single layer. Thus we
simply need to relate RadS(LF ) to RadS(F).
First, let us consider the natural case, for which
Lnat(X,Y, f) , φ(f(X), Y ). If φ(·, ·) is γ−Lipschitz in
the first argument, we can use the Talagrand contrac-
tion lemma (Ledoux and Talagrand, 2013), which gives
that RadS(LF ) ≤ γ RadS(F). Thus, substituting this
inequality into (11), we have
PS∼pD
(
rD(f)−RN (f) ≤ 2cγO(log(dmax))
+3c
√
log(2/δ)/(2N)
)
> 1− δ,
(13)
such that our generalization error bound scales as
O(log(dmax)).
We now introduce an analogous result for the SRR.
Theorem 2. For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and all f ∈ F ,
PS∼pD
(
rstatD (f)−RN (f) ≤ 2cγO(log(dmax))
+3c
√
log(2/δ)/(2N)
)
> 1− δ,
(14)
where c and γ are equal to their values in the natural
risk case. In other words, the generalization error
for the SRR is upper bounded by an expression with
dependence on log(dmax).
Proof. Firstly, using the law of total expectation, we
can rewrite the SRR in the form of a single expectation
over (X,Y,X ′)
rstat(f) = E(X,Y )∼pD,X′∼p(·|X) [φ(fθ(X ′), Y )] . (15)
Notice that this takes the form of natural risk on an ex-
tended space, with a natural loss function φ(fθ(X ′), Y ).
Since this loss does not depend explicitly on X, we can
further rewrite it as and expectation over (X ′, Y )
rstat(f) = E(X′,Y )∼qD [φ(fθ(X ′), Y )] , (16)
where qD((X ′, Y )) ∝
∫
X pD(X,Y )p(X
′|X)dX. This is
now precisely in the natural form with qD replacing pD.
Moreover, as c and γ depend only on φ, their values
are unchanged from the natural case and so we can
directly invoke (13).
In contrast, for the adversarial risk (in binary classifica-
tion), where Ladv(X,Y, f) , maxδ∈∆ φ(fθ(X + δ), Y ),
RadS(LadvF ) is lower bounded by an expression con-
taining explicit dependence on
√
din, where din is the
dimension of the input layer to the NN (Yin et al.,
2019). While this lower bound does not allow us to
directly bound the generalization error using Equation
(13), it does suggest that in high dimensions the adver-
sarial generalization error can be much greater than the
natural and statistically robust generalization error.
This indicates it will typically be difficult to train net-
works that are adversarially robust at test time for
high-dimensional datasets. On the other hand, our
analysis shows that statistically robust networks may
be easier to obtain.
5 RELATED WORK
The concept of training neural networks with randomly
perturbed inputs is, of course, not new (Plaut et al.,
1986; Elman and Zipser, 1988; Sietsma and Dow, 1991;
Holmstrom and Koistinen, 1992; Minnix, 1992; An,
1996). For example, Elman and Zipser (1988) show
how the accuracy of neural networks trained to classify
phonemes is improved by perturbing the inputs with
uniform noise normalized by the scale of the inputs.
They note that training with noise performs a form of
data augmentation, smoothing the decision boundaries,
and thus improving the model’s generalization to new
inputs. Webb (1994) and Bishop (1995), meanwhile,
make explicit the connection between training with
perturbed inputs and regularization, proving that for
the sum-of-squares loss function, training with noise is
approximately equal to training with Tikhonov regu-
larization. Other work has investigated training neural
networks by perturbing other components of the neu-
ral network such as its weights (An, 1996; Jim et al.,
1996; Graves et al., 2013), targets (Szegedy et al., 2016;
Vaswani et al., 2017), and gradients (Neelakantan et al.,
2015), with a similar motivation to input perturbation.
Modern widely used techniques such as dropout (Sri-
vastava et al., 2014; Wager et al., 2013) can also be
interpreted as regularization by the addition of noise.
Our work differs from these previous approaches in
that training with noise emerges from a principled risk
minimization framework, rather than being taken as
the starting point of algorithmic development with a
justification ex post facto. Moreover, we use input per-
turbations not only during training but also as a means
of evaluating the robustness of the classifier at test-time.
We have also drawn novel connections and comparisons
between existing adversarial/robustness methods and
probabilistic input perturbations, providing conceptual,
theoretical, and (later) empirical arguments for why
the latter is an important component in the greater
arsenal of robust classification approaches. We further
highlight that our framework is more general than the
simple addition of Gaussian or uniform noise to the
inputs of a standard loss function, in that both the per-
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Figure 1: A-TSRM computed on the MNIST test set
over a range values of . Each line represents a different
network, trained either naturally or with corruptions.
turbation distribution and loss function can be crafted
to incorporate prior knowledge about the task at hand.
6 EXPERIMENTS
To empirically investigate our SRR framework, we now
present a series of experiments comparing it with natu-
ral and adversarial approaches. For training using the
SRR, we follow the approach from Section 3.2, gener-
ating perturbations X ′n to points Xn in the training
dataset and then using a mini-batch version of the
gradient update in (9).
Unless otherwise stated, we train using the cross en-
tropy loss,
φCE(fθ(X ′), Y ) , − log(fθ(X ′)Y ), (17)
referring to training on the resulting SRR as corruption
training. To maintain consistency with natural training
settings, we then evaluate using the 0-1 loss function
φ01(fθ(X ′), Y ) = 1arg maxi fθ(X′)i 6=Y . (18)
We refer to the resulting SRR as Accuracy-TSRM (A-
TRSM), since this is a version of (6) where the event
{s(X ′) ≥ 0} corresponds to {arg maxi fθ(X ′)i 6= Y }.
6.1 Comparison to Natural Accuracy
In this experiment, we show that naturally trained net-
works are vulnerable under the A-TSRM metric and
that corruption training can alleviate this vulnerability.
Specifically, we examine the A-TSRM for naturally
trained and corruption trained neural network classi-
fiers on MNIST, using corruption models given by the
uniform distribution on L∞-balls of radius .
We use a dense ReLU network with an input layer of
size 784, a hidden layer of size 256, and an output layer
of size 10. We train using 5 different methods: natural
training (i.e.,  = 0), and corruption training with
 = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7. We then evaluate on A-TSRM
using a range of values of  from 10−3 (below the level
of discretization in the pixel values and thus invisible)
to 0.7 (difficult for even humans to classify).
The results, shown in Figure 1, provide several interest-
ing insights. Most notably, corruption training led to
reduced values for the A-TSRM compared to natural
training for all values of  equal to or larger than the
value used in training (with the exception that training
with  = 0.1 did slightly worse when evaluated with
 > 0.4). These gains are sometimes more than an
order of magnitude in size, confirming that, not only is
A-TSRM highly distinct to natural accuracy, but train-
ing using an appropriate SRR can provide significant
A-TSRM benefits at test-time. Though this comes at
the cost of reduced test-time accuracy for this example
(as highlighted by evaluations at small values of ), we
will later find that this is not always the case.
6.2 Empirical Generalization Error
As previously noted, it has proved challenging to train
networks to achieve high test-time adversarial accuracy
on higher-dimensional datasets such as CIFAR-10 due
to poor generalization from training. By contrast, our
analysis in Section 4 suggests that the gap will be more
similar to natural accuracy for SRR approaches. We
thus investigate the generalization gap experimentally
for A-TSRM on CIFAR-10. Additionally, we compare
corruption training with the PGD adversarial training
method of Madry et al. (2018), which is designed to
maximize adversarial accuracy.
We use a wide residual network architecture (Zagoruyko
and Komodakis, 2016) with depth 28, widening factor
10, and dropout rate 0.3. We train using four different
methods: natural training, corruption training with
 = 0.157 and  = 0.5, and PGD adversarial training
(7 gradient steps) with  = 0.157. Correspondingly, we
then evaluate these networks using natural accuracy,
A-TSRM with  = 0.157 and  = 0.5, and adversarial
accuracy with  = 0.157 (computed using 7-step PGD).
Here  = 0.157 corresponds roughly 8/255 in pixel
values, which is used as the corruption set by Madry
et al. (2018) for adversarial training, while  = 0.5
represents a more extreme corruption model.
We report the train/test scores after 30 epochs (av-
eraged over 5 runs) in Table 1. Though we run each
training process with the same number of epochs, ad-
versarial training took significantly longer than natural
or corruption training (approx. 6 times).
On all of natural and A-TRSM evaluation metrics
and all training methods, we observe a fairly small
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Training Method
Natural,
 = 0
Corruption
 = 0.157
Corruption
 = 0.5
PGD
 = 0.157
Evaluation
Metric
Natural,  = 0 98.7/92.9 98.0/92.2 93.7/87.9 96.3/88.1
A-TSRM,  = 0.157 94.9/89.4 98.1/92.4 94.1/88.1 96.3/88.1
A-TSRM,  = 0.5 60.0/57.6 79.9/76.0 95.6/89.9 94.9/86.1
Adversarial,  = 0.157 0.3/0.3 2.4/2.5 13.1/12.8 67.3/40.1
Table 1: Train/test set evaluations of different networks on CIFAR-10, scores given in % and averaged over 5
runs. The best test set performance for each evaluation metric is highlighted in bold.
generalization gap of up to about 8%, which is in line
with the natural/natural generalization gap of 5.8%.
This compares very favorably to adversarial accuracy,
for which we see a much larger gap of 27.2% for the
PGD trained network (and where Schmidt et al. (2018)
found a 50% generalization gap eventually, running for
more epochs on the same architecture). This provides
support for our theoretical analysis suggesting that A-
TSRM (statistical robustness) generalizes better than
adversarial accuracy for higher dimensional datasets.
For the natural and A-TSRM metrics, we also notice
that the best test-set performance was achieved using
the corresponding natural/corruption training method.
The drop in performance from training using larger
values of  than those used in the evaluation was far
less than in the reciprocal case. For example, corruption
training with  = 0.5 had a test natural accuracy 5%
below natural training, but natural training had an
A-TSRM 32.3% worse than corruption training.
Interestingly, PGD (with  = 0.157) was also found to
be fairly effective in improving the A-TSRM, recording
consistently good test-set values comparable to cor-
ruption training. However, as previously mentioned,
PGD incurs a large cost in computational time, due to
the gradient step computations and the relatively slow
training (with respect to epochs) due to the harder
computational task of improving adversarial accuracy.
Thus, if we are concerned with optimizing the A-TSRM
metric, corruption training is an efficient and effective
training scheme, while adversarial methods can also be
effective but may be much slower.
6.3 Tailored Loss Functions
In risk frameworks, we often wish to tailor the loss
function φ to better represent a particular problem.
In particular, the cost associated with misclassifica-
tions may vary for different true labels and different
predictions. For example, a self-driving car predicting
the road is clear when there is actually a pedestrian
will be far more damaging than predicting there is a
pedestrian when the road is clear. The SRR can be
particularly useful in such situations, as networks need
to be robust to noise in their inputs to fully incorporate
all uncertainty present in the decision making process.
To provide a concrete example, we consider training
and evaluating using a weighted cross entropy loss
φ(fθ(X ′), Y ) = −w(Y ) log fθ(X ′)Y (19)
where the weights w(Y ) reflect the relative importance
of making accurate positions for different values of the
true label Y . For example, by taking w(Y ∗) >> 1
for a particular problem class Y ∗ and w(Y ) = 1 for
others, the classifier will be heavily penalized if it fails
to correct identify with high-confidence all occurrences
of Y ∗. In turn, this heavy penalty can increase the
sensitivity to perturbations in the inputs: we do not
want our classifier to confidently predict that Y 6= Y ∗
if our input is close to points for which Y = Y ∗, as
this risks incurring the heavy penalty if our inputs are
noisy or our classifier is imperfect.
To assess the efficacy of SRR compared with natural
risk in this setting, we consider training on MNIST
using the same architecture as in Experiment 6.1, but
with a weighted CE loss where w(8) = 100 and w(Y ) =
1 otherwise, i.e. penalizing classifiers which fail to
confidently identify images of the figure 8. We also
change the perturbation distribution from those used
earlier, taking p(X ′|X) ∼ N (X,σ2I) with σ = 0.3.
The results, shown in Figure 2, exhibit several inter-
esting traits. Firstly, we see in the bottom left plot
that natural training is extremely vulnerable to noisy
input perturbations for this problem, producing SRR
values at both train and test time that are multiple
orders of magnitude worse than those achieved when
corruption training (bottom right). This highlights the
importance both of considering the SRR at test time
and also its ability to provide effective robust training.
Secondly, we see that while training with natural risk
very quickly overfits (top left), corruption training with
the SRR provides far better generalization (bottom
right). In fact, the final test SRR of the corruption
Preprint. Work in progress.
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Figure 2: Learning curves using weighted cross-entropy loss on MNIST with w(8) = 100. Each plot represents a
combination of training method and evaluation metric. For the bottom left plot, note the different y-axis scaling,
and that the training set SRR almost coincides with the test set SRR and thus is not visible.
trained network is far lower than the final test natural
risk on the natural risk trained network, a powerful
result given that the former is a corrupted version of
the latter. Moreover, evaluating the corruption trained
network, we achieve lower SRR risk (top right) than
natural risk (top left). Thus even when the inputs are
not corrupted, we can achieve better weighted cross
entropy loss by artificially adding noise to both the
training procedure and at test-time. This indicates
that for the weighted-cross entropy loss, the SRR can
provide robustness not only by accounting for potential
input noise but also by better accounting for the im-
perfect nature of the network to avoid overconfidently
dismissing the potential for a test-time datapoint to
belong to the problem class.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by applications where test-time corruptions
are not generated adversarially but probabilistically,
we introduced a statistically robust risk (SRR) frame-
work, providing a class of metrics for evaluating robust
performance under probabilistic input perturbations
that are amenable to efficient training. We showed that
the SRR can differ significantly from both natural and
adversarial risk, and that networks with low test-time
SRRs can be achieved through training with corrupted
inputs. Unlike adversarial risk, our results suggest sta-
tistically robust risk generalizes from the training data
similarly to, and potentially even better than, natural
risk, meaning that it has more general practical ap-
plicability to high-dimensional datasets and complex
architectures. Thus, for probabilistic corruption threat
settings, robust neural networks may be within reach
for a wide range of applications by using SRRs.
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